THE BRITISH HOUSE OF LORDS
The proper function of the British House of Lords in the legislature is not really in dispute. It was described succinctly in the 19th Century “The House of Lords ............ did nothing in particular, and did it very well.” That is to say, what is wanted is an independent and effective revising Chamber, no more. There seems to be virtual consensus on this point, which Solon and his colleagues heartily support. Britain has fairly recently institutionalised new potential conflicts between the Commons and the European Parliament, and also with the first three Regional Assemblies in Scotland Northern Ireland and Wales. New sparring partners for the over-mighty Commons are welcome, but Ockham’s razor applies: they should not be created where there is no need.
Any elected House of Lords can therefore be ruled out. It would be composed of politicians with mandates, seeking powers and functions. That is not what is wanted.
A House composed of appointees for life seems at first sight more suitable. However, the record of Senators appointed for life begins with Caligula’s horse, and not many of them have proved very much more independent or effective since. Life Peerages have an obvious appeal to party leaders and managers hungry for patronage as a means of managing their flocks. They have less appeal to the citizens. There is a feeling abroad, which Solon shares, that Prime Ministerial and party leader patronage has expanded, is expanding, and ought to be diminished.
On the other hand, a House dominated by hereditary legislators, selected by accident of birth, has functioned much better (and much longer) in a democratic context than a simple minded constitutional rationalist would have expected. The principal complaint, often reiterated, is that the hereditary peers are drawn, in overwhelming predominance, from a narrow, highly privileged social group whose biases the House as a whole has reflected.
For Solon, the obvious remedy is to do away with the bias, not meddle with the excellent principle of accidental membership. He has been impressed when on British jury service by the collective capacity of his fellow jurors. The reform he proposes is essentially simple, minimal, non-partisan and likely to prove very popular in a nation which has taken to lotteries. He proposes that:
· Each year (perhaps on Guy Fawkes day, since that still approximates to the beginning of the Parliamentary session), Her Majesty in State, and on television, shall prick at random one name from the roll of all those qualified for jury service. A computer which has already divided the total of potential jurors by 100, shall then apply that quota from Her Majesty’s chosen starting point, and print out the other 99 names and addresses needed to make up the 100 who will be selected as Peers of Parliament to serve for five years. Around the country, three man teams of a herald in his tabard, a state trumpeter and a clerk working for the Clerk of Parliaments will receive these names, collect the local beat bobby to introduce them, and set out to serve writs of summons to the next session of Parliament on those chosen. No doubt, television camera teams will choose to accompany them. Unless they do not serve, those chosen will keep the courtesy titles of Lord and Lady for the rest of their lives..
In this way a House of 500 members will build up over five years. In each of the first five years one fifth of the existing house, chosen by lot, could retire. But for continuity, they would be able to elect, say, ten of their number each year for a further five year term.
The Prime Minister, in consultation with his fellow party leaders, would retain a limited patronage power to make sure that their policies were adequately voiced in the reformed chamber. Solon proposes that the number of such appointed members should never exceed fifty. That is to say, such appointments would not be for life.
The reformed House itself should have power to elect for life about three Earls of Parliament each year. The House could choose to honour anyone. This would rapidly become one of the most desired honours in British public life, though no doubt producing occasional eccentric results. (These Earls of Parliament might also receive, e.g., life tenancies of those stately homes which the National Trust feels would be better for having someone actually in residence.)
Solon sees advantages in keeping voices of the professions (notably the Law Lords), and of religion (a wider selection than the Church of England Bishops) in the reformed House, but sees no reason why they should be embarrassed with a vote.
When veiling himself in historical pomp and circumstance, Solon sees this reform of the House of Lords as an overdue parallel to the evolution of the jury of nobles to judge nobles granted in Magna Carta, into the jury of common people to judge common people of modern times. The House of Lords would truly become the Grand Jury of the nation (and nothing more).
When posing as a social scientist, Solon describes this reform as a ground breaking innovation. It will be the first proper incorporation of scientific sampling of the population into the organs of government; a scientifically chosen rotating representative panel of electors inputting their considered views directly into the legislative process (and nothing more). He is wary of stressing this for fear that other social scientists who make a very good income out of in-depth political surveys, focus groups, etc., realise that party leaders will come to get much of the political feel they seek for the way the electorate will think when facing the issues (a feel that they are now paying handsomely for) directly from the new House of Lords, without spending party funds.
When simply being himself, Solon recalls that appointment by random selection was, quite often, a part of the Athenian constitution.
Should you wish to comment, an email to solon@use-solon.org may draw a response.
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