“From the halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli” is the first line in the march of the US Marines. They have extended their ambit of successful action since then (“From the hills of Iwo Jima to the deserts of Kuwait”?) but on the streets of Mogadishu[1] they discovered that they were not policemen. Since then, in the Balkans and elsewhere, the idea of a superpower or superpowers as policemen of the world has been made to look consistently hollow because the superpowers cannot deploy enough of the right kind of police; and if they could, they would hesitate to do so where significant casualties amongst their police could create political problems at home.
Solon sees a solution to this continuing and worsening dilemma (re-imposing law and order on the Central Asia borders of Afghanistan, in the forests of the Congo? Etc., etc.) in increasing the supply of suitable policemen and divorcing them from the domestic political processes. The type of police required are gendarmes (call them Guardia Civil, Federales, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Carabinieri or what you will). The supply is there in a major traditional source of recruitment for gendarmes, recently retired ex-military. The world’s shrinking armed forces have produced a very large current crop of potential volunteers, disciplined men and women willing to risk their lives. The obvious home for a single world force of such police is under the UN Security Council.
Solon sees no need whatever for a UN army. The member states still have far more than enough men and women under arms to do any fighting needed against organised opposition. And most states would be justifiably suspicious of any such army. But a police force which is allowed to operate only against anarchic disorder is a different kettle of fish There is a debatable boundary between where disorder ends and de facto government begins that would have to be worked through in individual situations, but the general rule is likely to be that the gendarmes leave any operations against any party with which the UN negotiates to the armed forces of member states. In other words, a UN Gendarmerie might be approved by the General Assembly surprisingly easily.
But Solon judges that the three advantages which will sell the idea of a Gendarmerie to the permanent members of the Security Council are that no one super power will be blameable or suspectable for the Gendarmes’ operations, no government will be domestically politically accountable for the deaths of Gendarmes, and (the clincher) Finance Ministries will realise that a UN Gendarmerie is likely to be cheaper than the alternative ad hoc individual state contributions. For some countries, the thought of finding employment for their more enterprising ex-soldiers may also be welcome.
The Gendarmes will have a specific mandate from the Security Council for every mission. The common elements in these mandates are likely to be responsibility to establish law and order, and to support responsible, democratic political institutions.
The Gendarmes standard mode of operations, established by the Military Committee of the Security Council, or by a special Sub-Committee for the Gendarmerie, will cover setting up their initial base, spreading out through the area, establishing local intelligence, recruiting local assistance, identification of and suppression of major threats to law and order.[2] The steps thereafter will be consolidation of the peace established.
The UN Gendarmes will look to strengthening the local police, reinforcing their intelligence network, and furthering the preparations for free and fair elections where those have not taken place. And on each mission, the UN Gendarmes will set up their own recruiting office. Initially, these offices will be out to attract the best of those who had been amongst the groups that caused the trouble. Not only do the best poachers make good gamekeepers, but they cease to be poachers. And when the UN Gendarmes mission is over, the recruiting office will remain to maintain the links established.
Solon sighs at the idea of the world being burdened and bored by another group of Generals (they will behave just the same if they are called Commissioners or whatever) making windy speeches to their men and women, standing through interminable and fairly incomprehensible rituals of the force, inspecting the ranks for spit and polish, and organising march pasts. The celebration of the glorious history and achievements of the UN Gendarmes, a celebration which is certain to start inside two years of their creation, is a topic he will try hard to avoid. Nevertheless, he regards the price as worth paying. One passing out parade for new cadet officers is likely to equal x children not killed, mutilated or abused. One droning hour of pompous speechifying can imply that schools will function for a year in a province where without the Gendarmes they would not have opened, and so on. Solon judges that this exchange rate is likely to be highly favourable.
No doubt the Gendarmerie march past will be “Muss i Denn” or something equally hackneyed. But Solon will be content with the spirit of the force if “A Policeman’s lot is not a happy one!” is sung at mess nights.
Should you wish to comment, an email to solon@use-solon.org may draw a response.
* * *
