The considered view of the whole Unit for Social Engineering, a view to which Solon subscribes, is that there is a class of organisation in which a rational management will always spend more than the money available in order to achieve competitive success. The managements of these organisations can and do rely upon emotionally committed supporters to bail them out before bankruptcy sets in. The Unit regards such organisations in their purer forms as enrichments to the economic and social scene. Many Unit members feel particular pleasure in seeing how far the notion of “economic man” has to be stretched and twisted to accommodate the committed supporters and donors who stump up the money.
The three principal identified forms of these organisations are opera houses, European football clubs and political parties. The Unit as a whole wonders if those who buy shares in football clubs as investments realise that if the directors act like football club directors, sooner or later they can be expected to take the club close to bankruptcy; and conversely success might be elusive if they don’t act like football club directors? Commercial support for opera houses seems harmless, because all that the commercial sponsor can be buying is association with something wonderful (Solon concedes to the majority view of his colleagues that it is possible for opera to be wonderful, even if he finds it more often weird and/or soporific).
Political parties are never wonderful, nor is there commercial advantage in being associated in the public mind with one or other party. Therefore the donations from commercial interests on which political parties and politicians have come increasingly to rely in their build-ups of funds and recuperations from near bankruptcy must represent purchases of something else.
Commercial contributions to political parties, to individual politicians or to political campaigns (whether via the Jack Abramoffs of this world, direct or through such devices as forgiving the capital or the interest on loans) are under inevitable suspicion of being made with a view to securing some degree of favour or absence of disfavour. That is to say, these contributions appear as though they could well be intended to be a form of bribe.
Whether or not the intention to secure favour or avoid disfavour from government is an element in a particular donation, politicians who look to the future of their party’s finances do and will find it difficult to assume that the flow of future donations will be unaffected by their treatment of the donor’s particular interests. Even if the commercial donor is pure in heart. (if, perish the thought, it should ever occur in a public limited company, donating company money out of purity of heart would probably be probably a breach of the trust directors owe to shareholders) no one else can assume that the money is given without thought to commercial advantage.
Non-commercial associations and organisations do not seek commercial advantage. Nonetheless, they generally represent one or more special interests. The Unit fails to see why a non-commercial organisation should contribute money to a political campaign of any sort unless it seeks advantage for those it represents. These organisations should have every right to argue for such advantage, but buying advantage is not persuasion.
The question remains of what exactly constitutes a political party, politician or political campaign. The key here in the Unit’s view is support for or opposition to a candidate or candidates in an election. Donations to the party or to the politician to get them elected are clear cases. Spending to attack a candidate is, in the Unit’s view, spending in support of the other candidate or candidates. Spending to advocate views presumed to be shared with a party or a candidate, or to attack views presumed to be held by another candidate is closely analogous.
On free speech grounds, the Unit agrees that these latter types of spending should be permissible whoever pays for them, except in a short period (perhaps 2 to 4 weeks) just before polling day. In this brief period the undecided voters are making up their minds. This is the process that actually decides an election that is in doubt; and in that period the need to ensure a fair and open vote tales precedence.
It follows that intentional spending of these sorts in this period should be treated as a potentially grave offence by the individuals responsible for the decision to spend. It is an attempt to improperly influence the voters, and should be suppressed with the same firmness as was applied to the old British custom of “treating” ( giving alcoholic drinks to reward your voters and make those of the opposition incapable of polling).
No member of the Unit can see any substantial reason why any donation by a commercial or special interest directly or indirectly to a politician, a political party or a political campaign should not be assumed in law to be an attempted bribe. The onus of proof should be on the donor to demonstrate that it is not intended as a bribe; a point that will usually be difficult to establish beyond reasonable doubt.
To simplify the question of what exactly constitutes a commercial or special interest, the Unit proposes that all donations other than by individual electors and/or other residents in the country should be assumed to be intended to secure favour or the absence of disfavour, and therefore all of them should be taken to be attempted bribes. So also should payments given to individual electors to enable them to donate to a party or a campaign.
Donations by residents can and should be assumed to be legitimate, unless they are so large that it would appear that the person concerned could gain advantage for his or her special interests from the donation. This question of a reasonable maximum size of donation from a resident requires judgement in each case. $1,000,000 might not be too much in a US Presidential election. (or, say, a general parliamentary election in a major European country) $100,000 might be too much for a seat in the US House of Representatives. Most sums in other country’s elections or US local elections would be lower, in many cases much lower; as would be the appropriate limits for annual donations to political parties outside of special donations for elections.
Anonymous donations by residents within these limits are no more objectionable in principle than the secret ballot. The practical problem is in establishing that the anonymous donor is a resident and that the sum is not additional to other donations taking his or her total over the appropriate limit.
The Unit’s modelling of the funding of political parties and campaigns from tax monies when the monies received depend on numbers of votes received points to two medium to long term problems which Solon considers grave. The more immediate is the incentive that this funding gives to the party mangers to put their efforts into building up a widespread mild preference for their party rather than into assembling a committed and potentially critical body of active supporters. This is a weakening of civil society at a critical point in a democracy, and Solon fears its consequences.
Secondly, such funding from public revenues is given in proportion to the established strength of parties (or of individual politicians). This puts new parties and politicians at an additional disadvantage. Over the long term, it can also be expected to tend to preserve existing parties beyond the natural dates for their demise. Party leaders hate to be reminded of the fact, but democratic political parties are born, and die. Democracy and good government are not helped by delaying the process.
Solon agrees that there is a public interest in seeing that party political activity is funded properly, as there is in promoting other worthy activity (certainly a stronger public interest than in donations to opera). He therefore proposes that the parties should be able to receive public moneys in direct ratio to the sums received in donations by residents up to the maxima allowed. One form of such receipts is recoupment of tax paid by the residents on the donation; another is US federal matching funds. All such devices avoid the two dangers from funding related to numbers of votes received.
In summary, Solon concludes:
1. Political funding from the public revenue depending on votes received is a soft option for party managers, and dangerous for the rest of us;
2. Funding from commercial and special interests has the effects of attempted bribery, and should be so treated; whereas
3. Donations from electors and other residents up to substantial maxima are sound, healthy and deserving of public encouragement and subsidy.
4. Campaigns for and against views presumed to be held by candidates are healthy, but need to be prohibited in the short period before elections when they risk becoming an improper influence on voters.
Should you wish to comment, an email to solon@use-solon.org may draw a response.
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