A  CONSTITUTION  FOR  EUROPE

 

 The Unit for Social Engineering has a British tinge, at present. Perhaps for that reason, the Unit as a whole does not share Solon’s zest for constitution-making. There is a collective tendency to regard healthy Constitutions as the product of gradual political evolution. Any entire new departure is felt to be a dubious prospect. And some Unit members have a new-found respect for the wisdom of French and Dutch voters.

  That said, the Unit heartily supports Solon’s view that European federalists’ best option is to copy the Constitution of the United States as nearly word for word as proves possible. If European federalists are so emotionally irrational as to reject the USA model because it was not ‘made in Europe’, the only other federal Constitution which commands general respect in the Unit is that of Switzerland. We commend that to European federalists as a good second best.

  However, the real political process is not considering such clear cut and tested federal options. Instead, the parties and personalities are assuming that if there is to be a move towards a Constitution, in one way or another, it will be from the basis of the existing European institutions. That being the case, it is essential to start from a considered judgement of the proven faults of these institutions. To start from any other point is downright perverse. If we neglect the faults of what we are building on, any constitutional innovation will have grave weaknesses in its foundations.

 

  The obvious failings of Europe’s present institutions are, in summary:

     a) Many officials of the Commission display, almost proudly, the symptoms of a bureaucracy which maximises its own satisfactions. That is to say, they are very comfortable, avoid accountability, are rather ineffective, are expensive for what they do, and show persistent tendencies to tolerate corruption. The bureaucracy needs much more demanding leadership, management and oversight.

    b) A shortage of effective control of activities and of expenditure.

    c) An apparatus for reaching political compromises that is cumbersome, not consistently framed, and slow.

    d  d)Institutional arrangements for putting forward the argaarguments of common interest have become diffuse and weaweak, as much within the institutions as in relation to the peo peoples of Europe and the wider world.

 

 In the view of the Unit, if these four issues are tackled and resolved, so far as pieces of paper can resolve them, so as to cope with the Europe of the 25 or 25+, then building upon existing institutions does not require agonising about the scope of common policies and activities. We will go on doing in common what we have been doing in common, with deletions and additions to the list as we come to agree that these are desirable. What is required is a permanent framework in which to decide as the times require on these deletions and additions, not a rigid definition of European competences.

  The Unit is particularly conscious of the need for a countervailing force to European Union bureaucracy. In principle, it would be desirable to constitute the proposed Council of Control from the national Parliaments of member states. However, the Unit does not regard it as realistic to look for a process of nominations from Parliaments independent of the manipulation of national governments. The draft therefore plumps for a process of nomination similar to the present nominations of Commissioners.

  The accretion of such ambiguous and indefinable concepts as the ‘democratic deficit’, the ‘pillars’ of the European Union’s activities, etc., etc., can be quietly and satisfactorily omitted from consideration; and a lean Constitution be produced to which it is difficult to add entrenchments for special interests.

  The Unit for Social Engineering accordingly offers the following draft of a stable constitutional framework for the common activities of Europe. It can be called a Constitution for a Union, for a Community, for a Confederation, for a Federation, for a League, for an Alliance, for an Association, for a Bloc, for a Commonality or for what you will. Only the title changes. The Unit considers that it has the additional merit, in the context of the European Union, that it can be adopted and adapted piece by piece

 

 A CONSTITUTION FOR THE COMMONALITY OF EUROPE

 

 Preamble

  We nations of Europe, having over centuries both built the glories of our cultures and suffered the tragedies of conflicts amongst us; and having over fifty years learnt the benefits of peaceful co-operation and common action in promoting the liberties and prosperity of our peoples, and in strengthening and enriching the diversity of our societies; do now agree and enact this Constitution to govern our common activities, building upon the work of two generations.

   I  Organs of Common Action

 Council of Control

  1) a)  There shall be a Council of Control, to which the government of each member state shall appoint one Councillor for each 40 million, or part thereof, of that member state’s population. The Councillors appointed shall select a President from their number, with the agreement of at least two-thirds of the Councillors serving. That President shall also be the President of Europe for all formal purposes.

  1)  b)  The President and members of the Commission shall be appointed from the Councillors of the Council of Control. While these Councillors are serving on the Commission, their places in the Council of Control shall remain vacant.

  1)  c)  The Council of Control shall have powers:

i)        to suspend or terminate any action by any of our organs of common action, other than the European Court of Justice, on the grounds that that activity is best conducted by national or sub-national  governments.

ii)       on the petition of any one or more of the Council of Nations, the Parliament, the Commission, the European Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors, the Central Bank or the Director of the Statistical Office, to enforce the investigation, suspension or dismissal for disciplinary causes of any functionary of the organs of common action .

iii)     to call for papers, for testimony, or for both in any common activity.

iv)     to propose to the Council of Nations, to Parliament and to the Commission any measures that the Council of Control judges useful for the greater efficacy, efficiency or accountability of common activities.

 

 Council of Nations

   2)  a)  There shall be a Council of Nations consisting of the head of government of  each member state or a deputy named by that government.

 2)  b)  The Council of Nations shall decide by consensus, or by a due majority of the members representing at least three quarters of the member states and at least two- thirds of our total population.

  2)  c)  The Council of Nations may institute and act through such Committees and Sub-Committees of the Council as the Council judges appropriate; and in particular shall elect a Committee of the Presidency of eight members chosen from eight states, two of whom in turn shall retire each year to be replaced by members from other states. A state which has retired from the Committee of the Presidency shall not be represented on that Committee in the following four years The Committee of the Presidency shall have powers to organise support services for the Council of Nations, subject to the approval of the Council’s financial estimates by Parliament, and to the oversight of the Council of Control and the Court of Auditors. 

 2)  d)  The President of Europe shall be the presiding officer of both the Council of Nations and the Committee of the Presidency The President shall have a vote in the Council and in the Committee if a matter cannot otherwise be resolved, but not on any other occasion. 

 2)  e)  The Council of Nations shall have powers: 

 i)                    to determine the nature of all our common policies and actions.

ii)                   to pass or reject legislative proposals presented to them, and to amend legislation.

iii)                 to appoint the President of the Commission from amongst the Councillors of the Council of Control, and to ratify as a whole the membership of the Commission.

  

 Parliament

  3)  a)  The Parliament shall consist of five hundred members elected by popular suffrage.

  3)  b)  The people of each member state shall elect one member of the Parliament for the first hundred thousand or part thereof of that state’s population, one member for the following two hundred thousand of population or part thereof, and one member for the subsequent seven hundred thousand of population, or part thereof. The remaining members shall be distributed amongst the member states in proportion to the remaining population of each member state after deducting the first one million of population.

  3)   c)  The members of Parliament shall be elected by such form of popular suffrage as shall be approved by Parliament. The form of suffrage may vary between member states if Parliament so decides.

  3)   d)  Parliament shall have power to institute such Commissions, Committees and Sub Committees as it may judge appropriate.

   3)   e)  Parliament shall decide by simple majority vote of members; with the exceptions of decisions to approve methods of suffrage, proposals to initiate legislation, and proposals to censure individual Commissioners, all of which shall require a majority of two thirds of the members qualified to vote.

  3)   f)  The powers of Parliament shall be:

                 i)                    to initiate legislation other than legislation to tax or to spend.

ii)                   to amend, pass or reject legislation before them, including legislation to tax or to spend and financial estimates and budgets.

iii)                 to study all aspects of our common affairs, and to question any functionary other than a functionary of the European Court of Justice.

iv)                 to ratify any proposed President and members of the Commission, as a whole.

v)                  to censure the President and members of the Commission as a whole, which shall result in their leaving office forthwith.

vi)                 to censure any individual Commissioner or President of the Commission, which shall result in the member censured  leaving office forthwith.

  

 Commission

   4)   a)  There shall be a Commission consisting of a President and eight further Commissioners named by the President of the Commission from the Councillors of the Council of Control. No two of these nine may be from the same member state.

  4)   b)  The functions of each Commissioner shall be determined by the President of the Commission.

  4)   c)  The duties of the Commission shall be:

             i)                    advising the Council of nations, the Committee of the Presidency, and the other Committees and Sub Committees of the Council of Nations in the common interest, and to that end to provide papers for and to attend all meetings of the Council of Nations.

ii)                   representing our common interests in any and all forums a where such representation may be desirable.

iii)                 administering and executing, both efficiently and effectively, our common policies in all their aspects..

iv)                 initiating legislation in our organs of common action.

v)                  responding to Parliament, to the Council of Control and to the Court of Auditors.

vi)                 budgeting and keeping the accounts of our common activities in due and good form

  4)   d)  The Commission shall engage such staff and assistance as the Commission deem appropriate, subject to the approval of the Commission’s financial estimates by Parliament, and to the oversight of the Council of Control and the Court of Auditors.

 

 Court of Justice

  5)   a)  There shall be a European Court of Justice consisting of an equal number of members as the Council of Control, to which each member state shall name a magistrate  or magistrates from national superior Courts. Magistrates so named shall serve a fixed term of eight years, which shall not be renewed

  5)   b)  The European Court of Justice is our supreme judicial authority.

  5)   c)  The Court may organise and administer our common judicial business in such manner and form as the Court decides, instituting and staffing such subsidiary courts and organs as it judges appropriate, subject to the approval of the Court’s financial estimates by Parliament, and to the oversight of the Court’s expenditure, efficiency and effectiveness by the Court of Auditors.

  

 Court of Auditors

 

 6)  a)  There shall be a Court of Auditors of nine members, no two of whom may be from the same member state. The members of the Court of Auditors shall be appointed by the Council of Control.

 

 6)   b)  The duties of the Court of Auditors shall be 

 i)  to receive the accounts, financial statements and such other information as the Court may require relevant to accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, for all our common activities.

ii)  to present to Parliament at its request, or on the initiative of the Court of Auditors, the principal features of the accounts and statements, and any significant faults in the accounts and statements.

iii)  to report to our organs of common action on the efficacy and efficiency of our activities, and on possibilities for improvement.

iv)  to investigate all apparent irregularities in our expenditures, despoliations and losses, and to instigate action as appropriate.

  

 6)   c)  The Court shall engage such staff and assistance as the Court deem appropriate, subject to the approval of the Court’s financial estimates by Parliament, and to the oversight of the Council of Control.

 

 Statistical Office

  

 7)   a)  There shall be a Statistical Office, the Director of which shall be named by the Council of Control. 

 7)   b)  The duties of the Statistical Office shall be 

 i)                    to certify the adequacy and accuracy of all statistics used in allocating voting power or resources in our common activities, and in particular those of population, of gross domestic product, of the financial surpluses or deficits of the public authorities in member states, and of the indebtedness of public authorities in member states.

ii)                   to provide such other statistics as our common activities may require.

iii)                 to provide such comparative statistics between states and sub-divisions of states, and such other statistics as may be relevant to our common activities, as the Director deems appropriate.

  7)   c)  The Director shall engage such staff and assistance as the Director deems appropriate, subject to the approval of the Statistical Office’s financial estimates by Parliament, and to the oversight of the Court of Auditors.

  

 Central Bank

  8)   a)  There shall be a European Central Bank the president and Directors of which shall be named by the Council of Control. No two of the President and Directors shall be from the same member state.

   8)   b)  The duties of the European Central Bank shall be 

 i)                    to issue and manage our common currency.

ii)                   to maintain the value and stability of our common currency, within such limits as the President and Directors may agree with the Council of Nations.

iii)                 to monitor, and to advise the Council of Nations and Parliament on the state and prospects for our finances and our economy.

iv)                 to operate in the financial markets by such means as the President and Directors may elect, to protect and promote stability and prosperity.

v)                  to consult with and co-ordinate the positions of  the central monetary institutions of member states.

  7)   c)  The President and Directors shall engage such staff and assistance as they deem appropriate, subject to the oversight of the Court of Auditors.

 

 II  Other  Provisions

 

  Legislation to tax or to spend

  1)  Legislation to tax or to spend for common purposes may only be initiated by the Commission. Such legislation must be approved by the Council of Nations and by the Parliament, but may only be amended by the Parliament. No such Parliamentary amendment may initiate new proposals to tax or to spend. 

 

 Precedence of European Law

  2)  European legislation passing into law takes precedence over each member state’s domestic legislation, subject to provisions 3) and 4) below

  

 Exception

 3)   a)  Any member state shall have the power to propose that a new common policy, activity or  legislation shall not apply  for the time being in that member state. All such proposals for exception from common activities shall be accepted unless that proposal is rejected by a due majority of the Council of Nations.  

 3)   b)  Any member state to which such an exception applies may at any time propose the ending of that exception. All such proposals shall be accepted unless that proposal is rejected by a due majority of the Council of Nations.

  

 Suspension 

 4)  a)  Any member state shall have the right to suspend itself from the totality of our common activities under this Constitution.

  4)   b)  Any member state may be suspended from the totality of our common activities under this Constitution by the vote of a due majority in the Council of Nations confirmed by a vote of Parliament.  

 4)  c)  Any member state suspended from our common activities may be re-admitted to them by the vote of a due majority of the Council of Nations confirmed by a vote of Parliament.

 New Members

  5)     States not currently members may be admitted to join in our common activities under this Constitution by the vote of a due majority in the Council of Nations confirmed by a vote of Parliament

 

 Terms of Office

  6)   Unless otherwise provided herein, all holders of positions specified in this Constitution shall be elected or appointed for terms of four years. No holder of such a position shall serve more than two consecutive terms in the same position.

 

 Boundaries Between Member States

 7)                  The boundaries existing between member states shall not be altered without the consent of the European Court of Justice. That consent shall only be given upon the petition of the member state or states affected, and upon the Court judging that a substantial majority of the citizens affected are in favour of the change. This provision shall govern transfer of territories between member states, union of member states, or the division of member states into two or more states.

 

 Judicial Identity

  8)                  Our common institutions shall have a single common judicial identity. 

 

 Ratification and Amendment

 9)  a)  This Constitution shall come into effect when duly ratified by the Legislatures of at least three quarters of  the current member states.

  9)   b)  Amendments to this Constitution may be made upon the initiative of a due majority of the Council of Nations confirmed by a vote of Parliament, and shall come into effect when duly ratified by at least three quarters of member states.

 

 Transitional Provisions

 10)   a)  The existing corpus of European law is accepted into future European law.

  10)   b) The existing institutions of the European Union shall be incorporated into the organs of common action under this Constitution, as the Council of Nations may deem appropriate.

  10)   c)  Existing exceptions of member states from any of our common activities shall continue; unless and until the member state concerned proposes the ending of that exception.

 

  

 

 ANNEX

 

 The European Declaration of Human Rights is annexed to this Constitution, and forms part of it.

 

Should you wish to comment, an email to solon@use-solon.org may draw a response